«Varieties of populism in the 2004 electoral campaign [in Romania] in relation to types of political culture»

Isabela Ieţcu-Fairclough
«Populism and the Romanian ‘Orange Revolution’»
Studies in Language and Capitalism, 2(1), 2007

Studies in Language and Capitalism | Loughborough University | Department of Social Sciences | Loughborough | UNITED KINGDOM


Extracto del apartado en páginas 63-67 del artículo en PDF

«Differences between argumentation strategies in the ‘supporters’ video-clips can be taken to indicate different assessments of the political culture of the Romanian population by political advisors and campaign staff. As I have said, Băsescu’s electoral message in this type of material seemed designed for an electorate that shared to a larger extent the values of a ‘participant’ type of political culture – see his repeated emphasis on ‘democratic institutions’, on justice, democracy, truth, citizenship – while Năstase’s was predominantly intended for an electorate that shared a ‘parochial’ type of political culture. The ‘subject’ type was addressed in terms of a promise to continue the gradual measures aimed at relieving poverty, by Năstase, and by a pledge, by Băsescu, to ‘crush’ the corrupt political system that was responsible for poverty. Occasionally, in its emphasis on justice, and particularly on individualism vs. collectivism, as well as through being endorsed by famous anti-communist, liberal intellectuals, Băsescu’s message seemed designed to target a liberal-democratic, civic type of political culture.

»I have argued that both candidates used populistic appeals in excess. This was also evident in the self-presentation video-clips that were shown repeatedly during the campaign (and included in the TV show on December 8), as well as in their final messages to the electorate. Năstase’s self-presentation clip was silent, apart from inspiring music. He was portrayed primarily as a family man, a lover of tradition, a devout Christian, a European politician, and a candidate in close contact with the poor rural and urban electorate. Băsescu’s self-presentation clip involved a narrower range of images (the family theme was not prominent; instead, there were images of Băsescu as a young marine, sea captain and ship commander, followed by images of his later career as Minister of Transport and Mayor of Bucharest) and was accompanied by a voice-over from a presenter and by words in capitals on the screen. In this clip, Băsescu’s electoral staff uninhibitedly exploited the theme of the chosen, providential leader. The verbal message was, essentially, the following: ‘Băsescu has so far had the most spectacular political career ... He is devoted to his work ... Everyone wanted to serve on the same ship with him... He has always seems to be predestined, fated (‘predestinat’, ‘sortit’) ... He has always sacrificed himself and the joy of being with his family for the work he has chosen ... He is not in love with power ... He is not seeking personal glory ... People love him and trust him ... Power must belong to those who are not in love with it ... This is why, for many people, he now seems to be a providential man (‘omul trimis’), a ‘saviour’ (‘salvator’) ... A sailor at the helm of the country? Yes, to prevent us from going down’ (‘Un marinar la cîrma ţării? Da, ca să nu ne scufundăm’).

»In his final address to the nation, Năstase implicitly presented himself as a son of the people, particularly of the rural world, as someone who had ‘listened attentively’ to the population’s complaints – a populistic touch that many people presumably found hypocritical. The emotional responses that were targeted seemed to be primarily feelings of inclusion and solidarity (Năstase is after all not different from any other Romanian, he is ‘one of us’), approval of respect shown for family and religious values, approval of modesty and reverence shown vis-à-vis the electorate, admiration for his professional competence and political skills, as well as for his allegedly compassionate and caring nature. In terms of overall rhetorical strategy, Năstase almost gave up rational persuasion in his final message and produced a purely ceremonial and expressive message, involving mainly thanks addressed to the electorate, a perfunctory acknowledgement of past ‘mistakes’ and ‘errors’, a pledge not to repeat them, and an invocation of God on the side of the Romanians (‘cu Dumnezeu înainte’). The message held up an almost mythical vision of Romania as being engaged, thanks to his efforts, on a ‘road’ to Europe, and an identification of what ‘we’, the Romanians, need in terms of ‘continuity’, ‘peace’, ‘stability’, ‘wisdom’, ‘calm’, etc. What the Romanians don’t need, Năstase said, obviously alluding to Băsescu, is a bellicose politician. Unlike Băsescu, whose occasionally pathetic emotional appeals to the electorate showed his vulnerabilities, and thus elicited sympathy and solidarity, Năstase chose to behave throughout the campaign as if he had already won.

»As I have already argued, a fairly different range of populist resources was used in Băsescu’s campaign. In the ‘two communists’ episode, Băsescu invoked the people in an emotional context: the Romanians were positioned as victims of the political system and as moral authorities (they ‘deserved’ a better choice of presidential candidates; the fact that they did not have much choice was unfair on them, a ‘curse’, a ‘drama’). This combined well with his own image as providential, trusted leader and saviour of his nation. What was nevertheless distinctive about Băsescu’s electoral message was its radicalism: Băsescu’s message was populist in this distinctive radical way in which Năstase’s was not, and could not be, and responded to the electorate’s deep-felt need for political authority and its mistrust in the political class.

»Populism, as I have said, can exploit an allegedly direct, quasi-mystical relationship between the charismatic leader and the people. This was used both in Năstase’s campaign, particularly in emotional arguments from ‘God-given’ beauty and power, as well as in all materials which constructed him as either a ‘father’ of the people or a ‘son’ of the village (the final message), but also quite strikingly in Băsescu’s campaign, in the theme of the providential leader in times of crisis (the self-presentation clip). While Năstase emerged as a paternalist leader in terms of social stability and consensus, Băsescu was constructed as a providential leader and saviour of his nation in times of crisis. The stylistic potential of metaphors (an element of strategic manoeuvring) was cleverly exploited: Romania was represented as a ship in danger of sinking, unless Băsescu took control of the helm; Băsescu was represented as a ‘knight’ dispensing justice (‘un cavaler al dreptăţii’), etc. – simple, yet effective images, hooking directly onto the electorate’s need for authoritarian leadership in times of crisis.

»Populism may also project grand future visions, based on simple images that appeal to a parochial type of political culture (e.g. an image of society as an organic entity, a family). This again was visible in Năstase’s campaign, particularly in the vision of reconciliation, harmony and consensus that was constructed, in which all conflict was dissolved, and all problems and difficulties seemed to disappear, under the guidance of a leader offering paternal care and affection. It also appeared in the image of Romania as a prosperous European country in the future (in Năstase’s final message and his supporters’ video-clip). By contrast, Băsescu’s message was more restrained in proposing future visions and limited itself to a radical critique of present-day Romania.

»Radical-authoritarian populism did not seem to be perceived as unreasonable or unacceptable for a majority of the Romanian electorate. One of the lessons of the 2000 election (considering the high number of votes that nationalist extremist leader Vadim Tudor had received) had been that the electorate does not perceive an authoritarian regime to be a threat to democracy, to individual rights and liberties, and would in fact welcome an authoritarian leader if he proved capable of dealing with the chronic weakness of the state’s institutions and put a stop to corruption, even through ‘exceptional measures’ and an ‘iron fist’ (Beciu 2001). Sociological focus group studies have in fact revealed a contradiction between the (relatively high) level of political information and competence of parts of the Romanian electorate and the nature of their authoritarian political option (Beciu 2001: 115 [‘Discurs şi comportament electoral în campania prezidenţială din 2000’, Revista română de comunicare şi relaţii publice, no. 4-5, pp. 97-118]). Other analysts have emphasized, on the other hand, the disparity between the predominant type of political culture in incompletely modernized countries like Romania and the modern democratic nature of the political institutions imported from western societies. Authoritarian options must be seen however in relation to current circumstances, so must be the nostalgia for communism which informs part of electorate’s populist options and selectively rehabilitates the dimension of order, authority and discipline of the defunct communist order. These options, strange or incongruent as they might be, are in fact voicing a deep-felt need for justice and political authority in a context that is perceived as anomic and chaotic.

»Băsescu’s defence of radicalism and authoritarianism managed in fact to keep its distance from Vadim Tudor’s extremism, particularly through Băsescu’s emphasis on the role of democratic institutions, and in the way in which he rejected various extremist themes – ‘international conspiracies’, or the anti-western rhetoric of Vadim Tudor’s 2000 message. Some of his interventions, however, sounded very similar to the latter’s authoritarian message, most notably the emphasis on his determination to be an active, ‘strong president’, involved in the daily activity of the state’s institutions, the use of a variety of humorous campaign leaflets which threatened severe punishment of corrupt politicians, and his blunt anti-corruption message in the final address to the nation: ‘As president, I will make justice independent, as president, I will crush the corrupt system, the mafia system that this year alone has drained 70,000 billion lei, which ... have ended in the pockets of the clientele’ (‘voi fi un preşedinte care va zdrobi sistemul corupt, sistemul mafiot...’).

»In drawing excessively on a paternalist type of populism, Năstase’s campaign achieved a relatively poor adaptation to audience demand, and misjudged or disregarded the concerns of a large part of the electorate. Băsescu’s radical, authoritarian message, on the other hand, showed considerable sensitivity to these concerns, not least of all by claiming that there were radical and quick solutions for them. To sum up, it was Băsescu’s campaign that showed better adaptation to a wider variety of audiences and types of political culture. In addressing a wide range of problems that were immediately relevant to the population (corruption, poverty, etc.), in putting up a clever counter-campaign aimed at deconstructing Năstase’s electoral slogans, in the clever use of humour and emotion, Băsescu’s campaign makers (and Băsescu himself) contributed to improving communication with the electorate, and enabling people to come to a better-informed decision. In this context, the fallacies that accompanied Băsescu’s campaign tended to go unnoticed and to be perceived as reasonable, as being well-adjusted to the demands of the Romanian context.»