«Narrated or performed, the myth may lose its original ritual function. Without a ritual context, the choreo-dramatic expression loses its pragmatic function – that of “modification” of the real: the illocutionary ritual act is thus replaced by a “fictional act”»

Nicoleta Popa Blanariu
«Towards a Pragma-Semiotics of Ritual(ized) Gesture and Performance»
Arte, individuo y sociedad, vol. 31, n.º 1 (2019)

Arte, individuo y sociedad (@unicomplutense) | Universidad Complutense de Madrid | Facultad de Bellas Artes | Departamento de Escultura y Formación Artística | Madrid | ESPAÑA

Se incluye a continuación el extracto de las páginas 42 a 44 y 50 a 52 (apartados «Introducción» y «Conclusiones») seleccionado de la publicación en PDF. Las referencias pueden consultarse en la ubicación original.

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«Introduction. The Performative Value of Ritual(ized) Gesture and Movement

»Regardless of the form they took in different cultures, the “political gesture”, the “liturgical gesture” (Schmitt, 1998), the daily gesture committed in public or private space have an important performative value, which the ritual always activates.

»Therefore, we propose an approach to “body techniques” (Mauss, 1950) – through which corpor(e)ality is codified in cultural terms – from a pragma-semiotics perspective. Particularly, “speech acts come in a variety of types”: by means of “acoustical blasts, I make a statement or ask a question, I give an order or I make a request”, that is, I perform an illocutionary act which is the “minimal complete unit of human linguistic communication” (Searle, 1999). In our opinion, the same convergence between the physical level of kinetic articulation and the symbolic investment of bodily expression, including its illocutionary component, is manifested in the cultural codification of gesture and movement from all over the world, as exemplified below.

»Highly performative, the symbolic gesture is able to determine the reconfiguration of the social landscape, of the inter-human relations, or of the relation between the sacred and the profane, like in magical and religious rituals. Claude Lévi-Strauss (1995) refers to the rites as a “paralanguage”. In our opinion, his taxonomy of ritual praxis is reducible to the dichotomy constative/performative introduced by John L. Austin, that he later reconsiders and transforms into the trichotomy locutionary/illocutionary/perlocutionary (1962; 1970).

»Whereas the constative utterance merely describes a fact or state of affairs, the performative utterance not only says, but actually performs something (Austin, 1962). As understood by Lévi-Strauss, ritual practice seems to closely follow Austin’s dichotomy: “simultaneously or alternatively, rites gives man the means to either change a practical situation or designate and describe it”. Most often, functions “overlap” or recover “two complementary aspects of the same process” (Lévi- Strauss, 1995, p. 410).

»When the rite aims to “change” a practical aspect, the ritual expression – multi and intersemiotic (gestures, words, musical and visual rhythms, costumes and accessories, etc.) – is, in our opinion, essentially performative. But, if the ritual utterance only “describes” or “designates” a certain aspect, then it is constative. We believe that the third possibility mentioned by Lévi-Strauss (1995) – where functions “overlap” “two complementary aspects of the same process” – is comparable to another aspect highlighted by Austin: the dichotomy constative/ performative, trenchantly established at the theoretical level, is not as firmly validated in practice, as long as all utterances are, in fact, performative (Austin, 1970; Récanati, 1970; Popa Blanariu, 2012; Popa Blanariu, 2013a). In the logic of “wild thought” (la pensée sauvage), a “logic of the sensitive” (Lévi- Strauss, 1962; Lévi-Strauss, 1970), the myth refers to an essential nonfictional truth, despite its fabulous appearance (Eliade, 1978; Cassirer, 1972).

»The tabooisation of this truth underlies all the anthropological theory of the “living myth” – an account of actions committed by sacred beings. In the societies that produced them, myths are considered “true histories”, as opposed to fictional “false histories” (Eliade, 1978). The opposition true vs. false is thus equivalent to real vs. fictional. Ojibwa Indians believe that myths are “beings endowed with consciousness able to think and act” (Lévi-Strauss, 1995). From our point of view, this means that myths – in their original form, inextricably linked to rites – involve both a cognitive dimension of Weltanschauung and a pragmatic one, of praxis.

»From the perspective of the practitioner, the storytelling or the ritual performance leads the narrator or actor and his audience in the middle of the mythical facts (Eliade, 1978; Cassirer, 1972). This is an eminently pragmatic effect of the mythical expression, of the order of “to do”. Thus, the performative ability of the myth validate, as a particular case, the general theory of speech acts. In such circumstances, the mythical logos is a form of action. (We do not here refer to its late, functionally modified aspect which is the literary myth).

»Not only the word but the entire ritual expression – movement, gesture, incantation, costumes and accessories – may be, in the logic of “wild thought”, a way of influencing the world. The rites aim to achieve a certain effect concerning the human life. Ritual drama lies “in an act of presence towards the invisible” and imposes some constraints related to “our body, posture, pose, gestuality”: dress requirements, raising hands or kneeling, a certain orientation and position in space.

»“The presence in front of the invisible” “essentially implies acts through which the supplicant expresses his desires, thoughts, needs, love and repentance in front of God or gods” (Chrétien, 1996, p. 37-75; Popa Blanariu, 2008, p. 322-323; Popa Blanariu, 2013b, p. 35-46). The typology of illocutionary acts performed by ritual expression covers the entire taxonomic configuration proposed by Searle, following in the footsteps of Austin. In our opinion, a statement by Searle on the relation between illocutionary force (which belongs to a universal langue, thus transcending boundaries between particular languages) and illocutionary verbs (language-specific) could be generalized.

»Searle considers that illocutionary acts are part of language (langue in a Saussurian sense), they belong to a quasi-universal linguistic pattern. Illocutionary verbs are, however, always connected to a particular language: French, English, Spanish, etc. The differences between illocutionary verbs are a good guide, but never an infallible guide for establishing differences between illocutionary acts (Searle, 1972; Searle, 1982; Searle, 2000; Searle&Vanderveken, 1985; Vanderveken, 1990; Vanderveken, 2005).

»By developing a theory of relevance, based on the critique of the classical theory of speech acts, Sperber and Wilson (1986) also note the universal character of acts such as “to say that”, “to tell somebody to”, “to ask whether”. By this they differ from “institutional” language acts that vary according to culture and language, moreover some acts do not even exist in certain cultures (see also Moeschler & Reboul, 1999; Alston, 2000; Tsohatzidis et alii, 1994).

»The generalization to which we referred is considering not only the transidiomatic nature of illocutionary categories, but rather their transverbal character. By this, we mean that different illocutionary values can be achieved both by verbal and non-verbal utterances – particularly through kinetic ritual expression.

»Conclusions. From the Sacred to the Aesthetic: “Fictional act” and “Speech act”

»Narrated or performed, the myth may lose its original ritual function. Without a ritual context, the choreo-dramatic expression loses its pragmatic function – that of “modification” of the real (Lévi-Strauss, 1995). However, it manifests a different one, essentially “aesthetic”. From our point of view, the illocutionary ritual act is thus replaced by a “fictional act”, a category which was previously described by both John R. Searle (1982) and Gérard Genette (1991).

»Regarding this process of desemantization through “aestheticization”, Lévi- Strauss points out that: “Where the domination of magical thinking tends to weaken and when rites acquire the character of vestige, the second function survives the former” (Lévi-Strauss, 1995, p. 410). In a way, the “constative” function survives the “performative” one, in Austin’s terms. This does not mean that “aesthetic” and “fictional” expression does not perform any illocutionary acts. But, they have a “fictional” character (Searle, 1982; Genette, 1991), and the pragmatic value of the fictional differs from that of the rite.

»The illocutionary acts performed in a show (ludus aestheticus) are “real” acts manifested in a fictional universe, assumed as such by the actors. However, the illocutionary ritual acts (ludus sacer) are perceived by the respective community as real acts in a real world (Eliade, 1964; Eliade, 1965; Eliade, 1994; Popa Blanariu, 2015b; Popa Blanariu, 2017).

»From the perspective of the ritual protagonist (whose illocutionary act of supplication, thanksgiving or homage is directed towards the sacred), rite is not fiction, fabulous action, but “real” action, aimed at attracting certain pragmatic effects in the order of the real.

»The reality of the ritual fact is traditionally stated: for the archaic world, the myth is “real”, because it tells of the manifestations of “true reality”: the sacred (Eliade, 1994). Ludus sacer may however become ludus aestheticus (Popa Blanariu, 2008). The illocutionary ritual act is thus replaced by a “fictional act” (Searle, 1982; Genette, 1991), manifested by the art’s means of expression. The status specific to the “aesthetic” – “fictional” – speech act comes from its nature of “simulacrum” (Searle, 1982, p. 111-113). Herein lies the “essential rule” of the fictional discourse, its illocutionary “goal”.

»But, the ritual actor summons the magic forces that he experiences – like the rest of the practicing community – as being “real”, able to truly change the world around them. The force of the rite, circulated through the illocutionary force of the ritual statement, verbal or non-verbal, relies on the practitioners’ faith in its full objectivity and efficiency.

»The “artist” (the protagonist of a ludus aestheticus, functionally different from ludus sacer) assumes its subjectivity, the fictionality of his own discourse. This is the rule of the game art, a game of illusion. If he accepts it, the spectator participates in the fictional game. Unlike the ritual act, whose “reality” is traditionally postulated, the fictional act gives an alternative to the real. The fictional game builds a fantastic world – this is its illocutionary purpose –, but no less viable (albeit unlikely) for those who accept the game.

»“Master of a universe which he amends”, the artist “creates forces, summons invisible presences, that are yet tangible for him” (Robinson, 1981, p. 48). The spectacular act “thus achieves a density that gives it authenticity and fullness” (Robinson, 1981, p. 49). “Authenticity” and “fullness” are indicators of the “success” of the fictional act, to the extent in which it manifests as an act of god – creating a para-real (fictional) universe with its own laws and conventions, alternative to those from reality.

»The inaugural logos of any fictional work is either directive or declarative act. This hesitation is also visible at Genette (1991). Implicitly or explicitly, fiction informs the spectator that he enters – or is invited to enter – a universe other than “real” world. The simulated illocutionary acts which constitute a work of fiction are made possible by the existence of a set of conventions that suspend the usual role of rules linking illocutionary acts and the world (Searle, 1982).

»The author of fiction “pretends to perform some illocutionary acts”, but “does not accomplish them in reality” (Searle, 1982). It is true that the author of a fictional discourse (in particular, the actor or dancer on the stage) simulates the achievement of illocutionary acts. But, based on this structure of simulacra, (s)he performs a specific illocutionary act: the fictional act – distinct from any other and constitutive of a good part of the manifestations of creativity.

»In a work of fiction, as Searle (1982) postulates, the illocutionary act is simulated, but the act of enunciation is real. The illocutionary act is simulated, which means that the normal illocutionary commitments of the enunciation are suspended (Searle, 1982). If the illocutionary acts of the fiction writer are generally simulated, if the illocutionary acts of the characters are “real” within the frames of the fictional universe (the actors pretending to be the characters), in one respect at least, the author complies with the “sincerity condition” of the illocutionary act: when he admits to be an author of fiction (Searle, 1982, p. 111). His fictional act (i.e., an act of producing a fiction) is honest, “real”, to the extent that it is recommended as an attempt to found a para(-)real, a fictional world.

»The fictional act may be interpreted as a directive. It tries – this is its essential rule, its illocutionary goal – to determine the speaker, reader or spectator, to do a certain thing: to accept the conventions of the fictional and, with them, the status of fictionality that is neither truth nor a mere “lie” but, as Searle says, “much more sophisticated than lying” (Searle, 1982, p. 111). The specific difference of the fictional act, compared to the other directive acts, consists, on the one hand, in the fact of subordinating a number of other illocutionary acts (whose set constitutes the fictional work) and, on the other hand, in the fact that it does not articulate the real with the real, but the real with the para-real, the real world with the fictional universe.

»The fictional game is not entirely different from that primordial demiurgic fiat, manifested through the Word, like in the biblical tradition, or through dance, like in the Indian myth about the god Shiva who creates the world by dancing. Simulacrum is a key term for how Searle defines the “fictional act” (Searle, 1982)».